Device authentication information installation system

ABSTRACT

A CE apparatus ( 9 ) is a terminal capable of including apparatus authentication information therein with a high degree of safety. A management server ( 7 ) encrypts apparatus authentication information and transmits the encrypted apparatus authentication information to a factory ( 5 ). A factory worker links a connection means ( 10 ) to a connector of the CE apparatus ( 9 ). The encrypted apparatus authentication information transmitted by the management server ( 7 ) to the factory ( 5 ) is supplied to the CE apparatus ( 9 ) in a state of being encrypted as it is by way of the connection means ( 10 ). The CE apparatus ( 9 ) includes an embedded write module for decrypting the encrypted apparatus authentication information and storing the apparatus authentication information in a storage unit. That is to say, the apparatus authentication information supplied by way of the connection means ( 10 ) is decrypted by the write module and stored in the storage unit employed in the CE apparatus ( 9 ). Since the apparatus authentication information is supplied to the CE apparatus ( 9 ) in a state of being encrypted as it is, the apparatus authentication information can be stored therein with a high degree of safety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to apparatus such as a terminal. Moreparticularly, the present invention relates to a technique for safelyhandling apparatus authentication information in an apparatus byencrypting the information, storing the encrypted information in theapparatus and decrypting the encrypted information in the apparatus.

BACKGROUND ART

In recent years, CE (Consumer Electronics) apparatus have been becomingpopular and getting widely used. Examples of the CE apparatus areaudio-visual apparatus such as a video deck, a stereo set and atelevision, household electronic appliances such as a rice cooker and arefrigerator and other electronic apparatus each including an embeddedcomputer for deriving benefit from a service rendered through a network.

Services provided by servers include a service requiring that a CEapparatus be authenticated. For this reason, the CE apparatus includesapparatus authentication information embedded in advance at the factoryas information used for authenticating the apparatus.

FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram referred to in description of theconventional method to include apparatus authentication information inan apparatus. Apparatus authentication information to be included in CEapparatus is managed by a management server 107 of a management center103.

The management server 107 transmits apparatus authentication informationto a factory 105 serving as a factory manufacturing CE apparatus.

Since the apparatus authentication information is secret informationthat must be handled with strict confidence, the apparatusauthentication information is transmitted to the factory 105 by makingefforts to prevent the information from being leaked out to others.

At the factory 105, a connection means 110 is linked to a connector of aCE apparatus 109. The connection means 110 is a unit for receivingapparatus authentication information from the management server 107 andsupplying the information to the CE apparatus 109.

The connection means 110 has an embedded function to decrypt encryptedapparatus authentication information. Thus, the connection means 110 iscapable of decrypting encrypted apparatus authentication informationreceived from the management server 107.

The connection means 110 then supplies the decrypted apparatusauthentication information to the CE apparatus 109 to be stored in astorage unit employed in the CE apparatus 109.

As an invention for including apparatus authentication information in aCE apparatus as described above, there have been discovered anelectronic-apparatus-manufacture system and anelectronic-apparatus-manufacturing method, which are disclosed inJapanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-134654.

In accordance with this invention, on the basis of a product serialnumber written on a barcode label seal pasted on a CE apparatus,apparatus authentication information of the apparatus is read out from adatabase and included in the apparatus.

By the way, with the conventional method, the connection means 110decrypts apparatus authentication information. It is thus quite withinthe bounds of possibility that the apparatus authentication informationis leaked out from the connection means 110.

In recent years particularly, there are many cases in which low-costoverseas producers are entrusted with manufacturing of products. It isthus necessary to provide a mechanism for including apparatusauthentication information transmitted to the factory 105 in a CEapparatus 109 with a high degree of reliability without leaking out theapparatus authentication information to others.

It is desired to provide a terminal or the like capable of includingapparatus authentication information in an apparatus with a high degreeof safety.

It is desired to confirm that apparatus authentication information hasbeen included in an apparatus properly in a state of handling theinformation with strict confidence.

DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 1 of the present invention, there isprovided an apparatus authentication information inclusion system, whichincludes a providing server and a terminal and is used for includingapparatus authentication information in the terminal as information usedby an apparatus authentication server to authenticate the terminal. Theapparatus authentication information inclusion system is characterizedin that:

the providing server provides source information used as a source forgenerating apparatus authentication information to the terminal andprovides the apparatus authentication information or the sourceinformation to the apparatus authentication server for authenticatingthe terminal; and

the terminal stores information as information necessary fortransmitting the apparatus authentication information by using thereceived source information and, at a terminal authentication time,transmits the apparatus authentication information generated from thesource information by using the stored information to the apparatusauthentication server.

In accordance with configuration 2, in the apparatus authenticationinformation inclusion system according to configuration 1,

the providing server provides the terminal with a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined directional-function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated from the source information;

the terminal generates a conversion value by execution of a conversionprocess using the predetermined directional-function on apparatusauthentication information generated from the received-sourceinformation; and

the terminal compares the generated conversion value with the conversionvalue received from the providing server to produce a result ofdetermination as to whether the generated conversion value is equal tothe received conversion value.

In accordance with configuration 3, in the apparatus authenticationinformation inclusion system according to configuration 1,

the terminal provides the providing server with a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined directional-function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated from the source information,

the providing server generates a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using the predetermined directional-function onapparatus authentication information generated from the received sourceinformation, and

the providing server compares the generated conversion value with theconversion value received from the terminal to produce a result ofdetermination as to whether or not the generated conversion value isequal to the received conversion value.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 4 of the present invention, there isprovided a terminal characterized in that the terminal includes:

source-information acquisition means for acquiring source informationprovided by a providing server as a source used for generating apparatusauthentication information;

generation means for generating apparatus authentication informationfrom the acquired source information; and

apparatus authentication information transmission means for transmittingthe generated apparatus authentication information to an apparatusauthentication server at an apparatus authentication time.

In accordance with configuration 5, in the terminal according toconfiguration 4,

the source information is encrypted apparatus authentication informationobtained as a result of a process to encrypt the apparatusauthentication information, and

the generation means generates the apparatus authentication informationby decrypting the encrypted apparatus authentication information.

In accordance with configuration 6, the terminal according toconfiguration 4 further has storage means for encrypting apparatusauthentication information generated by the generation means and storinga result of encrypting the apparatus authentication information, whereinthe apparatus authentication information transmission means decryptsapparatus authentication information stored in the storage means andtransmits a result of decrypting the apparatus authenticationinformation.

In accordance with configuration 7, the terminal according toconfiguration 6 further has key generation means, which is used forgenerating an encryption key for processes to encrypt apparatusauthentication information to be stored into the storage means anddecrypt apparatus authentication information stored in the storage meansby using information peculiar to the terminal when it is desired toutilize the encryption key.

In accordance with configuration 8, the terminal according toconfiguration 7 further has key deletion means for deleting thegenerated encryption key within a predetermined period right after useof the encryption key.

In accordance with configuration 9, the terminal according toconfiguration 4 further has:

conversion-value acquisition means for acquiring a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on the apparatus authenticationinformation from the providing server;

conversion-value computation means for computing a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using the predeterminedone-directional function on the generated apparatus authenticationinformation; and

determination means for producing a result of determination as towhether or not the acquired conversion value is equal to the computedconversion value.

In accordance with configuration 10, the terminal according toconfiguration 9 further has:

conversion-value computation means for computing a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using another one-directional functionon the generated apparatus authentication information; and

conversion-value-providing means for providing the computed conversionvalue to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 11, the terminal according toconfiguration 4 further has:

conversion-value computation means for computing a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using a predetermined one-directionalfunction on the generated apparatus authentication information; and

conversion-value-providing means for providing the computed conversionvalue to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 12, the terminal according toconfiguration 4 further has storage means for storing the acquiredsource information, wherein the apparatus authentication informationtransmission means generates apparatus authentication information fromthe stored source information and transmits the apparatus authenticationinformation to the apparatus authentication server.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 13 of the present invention, there isprovided an apparatus authentication information processing methodadopted in a terminal implemented as a computer includingsource-information acquisition means, generation means and apparatusauthentication information transmission means. The apparatusauthentication information processing method is characterized in thatthe apparatus authentication information processing method has:

a source-information acquisition step of driving the source-informationacquisition means to acquire source information provided by a providingserver as a source used for generating apparatus authenticationinformation;

a generation step of driving the generation means to generate apparatusauthentication information from the acquired source information; and

an apparatus authentication information transmission step of driving theapparatus authentication information transmission means to transmit thegenerated apparatus authentication information to an apparatusauthentication server at an apparatus authentication time.

In accordance with configuration 14, by the apparatus authenticationinformation processing method according to claim 13,

the source information is encrypted apparatus authentication informationobtained as a result of a process to encrypt the apparatusauthentication information; and

at the generation step, the apparatus authentication information isgenerated by decrypting the encrypted apparatus authenticationinformation.

In accordance with configuration 15, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing method according to claim 13 further has astorage step of encrypting apparatus authentication informationgenerated by the generation means and storing a result of encrypting theapparatus authentication information into storage means also employed inthe computer whereby, at the apparatus authentication informationtransmission step, apparatus authentication information stored in thestorage means is decrypted and transmitted.

In accordance with configuration 16, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 15further has key generation means, and the apparatus authenticationinformation processing method further has a key generation step ofdriving the key generation means to generate an encryption key prior touse of the encryption key in processes to encrypt apparatusauthentication information to be stored into the storage means anddecrypt apparatus authentication information stored in the storage meansby using information peculiar to the terminal.

In accordance with configuration 17, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 16further has-key generation means, and the apparatus authenticationinformation processing method further has a key deletion step of drivingthe key deletion means to delete the generated encryption key within apredetermined period right after use of the encryption key.

In accordance with configuration 18, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 13further has conversion-value acquisition means, conversion-valuecomputation means and determination means, and the apparatusauthentication information processing method further includes:

a conversion-value acquisition step of driving the conversion-valueacquisition means to acquire a conversion value obtained as a result ofa conversion process carried out by using a predeterminedone-directional function on the apparatus authentication informationfrom the providing server;

a conversion-value computation step of driving the conversion-valuecomputation means to compute a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using the predetermined one-directional function onthe generated apparatus authentication information; and

a determination step of driving the determination means to produce aresult of determination as to whether or not the acquired conversionvalue is equal to the computed conversion value.

In accordance with configuration 19, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 18further has conversion-value computation means andconversion-value-providing means, and the apparatus authenticationinformation processing method further includes:

a conversion-value computation step of driving the conversion-valuecomputation means to compute a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using another one-directional function on thegenerated apparatus authentication information; and

a conversion-value-providing step of driving theconversion-value-providing means to provide the computed conversionvalue to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 20, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 13further has conversion-value computation means andconversion-value-providing means, and the apparatus-authenticationinformation processing method further includes:

a conversion-value computation step of driving the conversion-valuecomputation means to compute a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using a predetermined one-directional function on thegenerated apparatus authentication information; and

a conversion-value-providing step of driving theconversion-value-providing means to provide the computed conversionvalue to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 21, the computer adopting the apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 13further has storage means for storing the acquired source informationand, at the apparatus authentication-information transmission step,apparatus authentication information is generated from the stored sourceinformation and transmitted to the apparatus authentication server.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 22 of the present invention, there isprovided an apparatus authentication information processing program tobe executed by a computer. The apparatus authentication informationprocessing program is characterized in that the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program includes:

a source-information acquisition function of acquiring sourceinformation provided by a providing server as a source used forgenerating apparatus authentication information;

a generation function of generating apparatus authentication informationfrom the acquired source information; and

an apparatus authentication information transmission function oftransmitting the generated apparatus authentication information to anapparatus authentication server at an apparatus authentication time.

In accordance with configuration 23, in an apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22, the sourceinformation is encrypted apparatus authentication information obtainedas a result of a process to encrypt the apparatus authenticationinformation, and the generation function generates the apparatusauthentication information by decrypting the encrypted apparatusauthentication information.

In accordance with configuration 24, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22 further has astorage function of encrypting apparatus authentication informationgenerated by the generation function and storing a result of encryptingthe apparatus authentication information, wherein the apparatusauthentication information transmission function decrypts apparatusauthentication information stored by the storage function and transmitsa result of decrypting the apparatus authentication information.

In accordance with configuration 25, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 24 further has a keygeneration function, which is to be executed by the computer to generatean encryption key for processes to encrypt apparatus authenticationinformation to be stored by the storage function and decrypt apparatusauthentication information stored by the storage function by usinginformation peculiar to a terminal when it is desired to utilize theencryption key.

In accordance with configuration 26, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 25 further has a keydeletion function to be executed by the computer to delete the generatedencryption key within a predetermined period right after use of theencryption key.

In accordance with configuration 27, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22 further has:

a conversion-value acquisition function to be executed by the computerto acquire a conversion value obtained as a result of a conversionprocess carried out by using a predetermined one-directional function onthe apparatus authentication information from the providing server;

a conversion-value computation function to be executed by the computerto compute a conversion value by execution of a conversion process usingthe predetermined one-directional function on the generated apparatusauthentication information; and

a determination function to be executed by the computer to produce aresult of determination as to whether or not the acquired conversionvalue is equal to the computed conversion value.

In accordance with configuration 28, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 27 further has:

a conversion-value computation function to be executed by the computerto compute a conversion value by execution of a conversion process usinganother one-directional function on the generated apparatusauthentication information; and

a conversion-value-providing function to be executed by the computer toprovide the computed conversion value to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 29, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22 further has:

a conversion-value computation function to be executed by the computerto compute a conversion value by execution of a conversion process usinga predetermined one-directional function on the generated apparatusauthentication information; and

a conversion-value-providing function to be executed by the computer toprovide the computed conversion value to the providing server.

In accordance with configuration 30, the apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22 further has astorage function to be executed by the computer to store the acquiredsource information, wherein the apparatus authentication informationtransmission function generates apparatus authentication informationfrom the stored source information and transmits an apparatusauthentication information to the apparatus authentication server.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 31 of the present invention, there isprovided a storage medium, which can be read by a computer and is usedfor storing an apparatus authentication information processing programto be executed by the computer to implement:

a source-information acquisition function of acquiring sourceinformation provided by a providing server as a source used forgenerating apparatus authentication information;

a generation function of generating apparatus authentication informationfrom the acquired source information; and

an apparatus authentication information transmission function oftransmitting the generated apparatus authentication information to anapparatus authentication server at an apparatus authentication time.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 32 of the present invention, there isprovided a providing server characterized in that the providing serverincludes:

source-information-providing means for providing a terminal with sourceinformation used as a source for generating apparatus authenticationinformation;

apparatus authentication information providing means for providing theapparatus authentication information or the source information to anapparatus authentication server for authenticating the terminal;

conversion-value-acquisition means for acquiring a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated on the basis of the source information from theterminal;

conversion-value computation means for computing a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using the one-directional function onthe apparatus authentication information; and

determination means for producing a result of determination as towhether or not the acquired conversion value is equal to the computedconversion value.

In accordance with configuration 33, the providing server according toclaim 32 further has determination-result transmission means fortransmitting a determination result produced by the determination meansto a main organization for including the source information.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 34 of the present invention, there isprovided an apparatus authentication information providing method to beadopted in a computer, which includes source-information-providingmeans, apparatus authentication information providing means,conversion-value acquisition means, conversion-value computation meansand determination means. The apparatus authentication informationproviding method is characterized in that the apparatus authenticationinformation providing method includes:

source-information-providing step of driving thesource-information-providing means to provide a terminal with sourceinformation used as a source for generating apparatus authenticationinformation;

an apparatus authentication information providing step of driving theapparatus authentication information providing means to provide theapparatus authentication information or the source information to anapparatus authentication server for authenticating the terminal;

a conversion-value acquisition step of driving the conversion-valueacquisition means to acquire a conversion value obtained as a result ofa conversion process carried out by using a predeterminedone-directional function on apparatus authentication informationgenerated on the basis of the source information from the terminal;

a conversion-value computation step of driving the conversion-valuecomputation means to compute a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using the one-directional function on the apparatusauthentication information; and

a determination step of driving the determination means to produce aresult of determination as to whether or not the acquired conversionvalue is equal to the computed conversion value.

In accordance with configuration 35, the apparatus authenticationinformation providing method according to claim 34 further has adetermination-result transmission step of driving determination-resulttransmission means additionally employed in the computer as furthermeans for transmitting a determination result produced by thedetermination means to a main organization for including the sourceinformation.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 36 of the present invention, there isprovided an apparatus authentication information providing program to beexecuted by a computer to carry out:

a source-information-providing function of providing a terminal withsource information used as a source for generating apparatusauthentication information;

an apparatus authentication information providing function of providingthe apparatus authentication information or the source information to anapparatus authentication server for authenticating the terminal;

a conversion-value acquisition function of acquiring a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated on the basis of the source information from theterminal;

a conversion-value computation function of computing a conversion valueby execution of a conversion process using the one-directional functionon the apparatus authentication information; and

a determination function of producing a result of determination as towhether or not the acquired conversion value is equal to the computedconversion value.

In accordance with configuration 37, the apparatus authenticationinformation providing program according to claim 36 further has adetermination-result transmission function to be executed by thecomputer to transmit a determination result produced by thedetermination function to a main organization for including the sourceinformation.

In order to achieve the above objects of the present invention, inaccordance with configuration 38 of the present invention, there isprovided a storage medium, which can be read by a computer and is usedfor storing an apparatus authentication information processing programto be executed by the computer to implement:

a source-information-providing function of providing a terminal withsource information used as a source for generating apparatusauthentication information;

an apparatus authentication information providing function of providingthe apparatus authentication information or the source information to anapparatus authentication server for authenticating the terminal;

a conversion-value acquisition function of acquiring a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated on the basis of the source information from theterminal;

a conversion-value computation function of computing a conversion valueby execution of a conversion process using the one-directional functionon the apparatus authentication information; and

a determination function of producing a result of determination as towhether or not the acquired conversion value is equal to the computedconversion value.

In accordance with the present invention, apparatus authenticationinformation can be included in an apparatus with a high degree ofsafety. In addition, it is also possible to verify that apparatusauthentication information has been included properly in an apparatuswith the apparatus authentication information kept in a confidentialstate as it is.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing a first embodiment in a simplemanner;

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of amanufacturing/authentication system in the first embodiment;

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of an apparatusauthentication section according to the first embodiment;

FIG. 4 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a work procedureexecuted at a preparatory stage of including apparatus authenticationinformation in the first embodiment;

FIG. 5 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forincluding apparatus authentication information into a CE apparatus inthe first embodiment;

FIG. 6 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forverifying that apparatus authentication information has been includedproperly into a CE apparatus in the first embodiment;

FIG. 7 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureadopted by an apparatus authentication server as a procedure forauthenticating a CE apparatus in the first embodiment;

FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram showing tables stored in apparatus suchas an apparatus authentication server according to the first embodiment;

FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a typical hardware configuration of a CEapparatus according to the first embodiment;

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing a second embodiment in asimple manner;

FIG. 11 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forincluding apparatus authentication information into a CE apparatus inthe second embodiment;

FIG. 12 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forverifying that apparatus authentication information has been includedproperly into a CE apparatus in the second embodiment;

FIG. 13 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureadopted by an apparatus authentication server as a procedure forauthenticating a CE apparatus in the second embodiment;

FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram showing tables stored in apparatussuch as an apparatus authentication server according to the secondembodiment;

FIG. 15 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forupdating an application including a key in a third embodiment;

FIG. 16 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of an apparatusauthentication section according to a fourth embodiment;

FIG. 17 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forverifying that apparatus authentication information has been includedproperly into a CE apparatus in the fourth embodiment; and

FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram showing the conventional method forincluding authentication information.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

Preferred embodiments of the present invention are explained in detailby referring to the diagrams as follows.

Outline of the First Embodiment

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing a first embodiment in a simplemanner.

A management server 7 for managing apparatus authentication informationis installed in a management center 3 and used for encrypting apparatusauthentication information prior to transmission of the encryptedapparatus authentication information to a factory 5.

A connection means 10 is linked by a worker of the factory to aconnector of a CE apparatus 9. The connection means 10 suppliesapparatus authentication information received from the management server7 in its encrypted state as it is to the CE apparatus 9.

The CE apparatus 9 includes an embedded write module for decrypting theencrypted apparatus authentication information and storing the result ofthe decryption in a storage unit.

As described above, the write module decrypts encrypted apparatusauthentication information received from the connection means 10 andstores the result of the decryption into the storage unit embedded inthe CE apparatus 9.

The connection means 10 is different from the connection means 110 usedin the conventional system in that the connection means 10 does notdecrypt apparatus authentication information received from themanagement server 7, but supplies the information to the CE apparatus 9right away as it is.

As described above, in this embodiment, apparatus authenticationinformation received from the management server 7 also referred to as aproviding server is supplied to the CE apparatus 9 also referred to as aterminal in the encrypted state as it is to be decrypted in the CEapparatus 9. Thus, the security of the apparatus authenticationinformation in the work to include the apparatus authenticationinformation can be improved.

It is to be noted that the above description merely explains the basicconcept of the embodiment. Thus, a variety of changes can be made towhat is described above.

For example, as will be explained in detail in the followingdescriptions of embodiments, decrypted apparatus authenticationinformation can be encrypted again by using another encryption key andstored in a storage unit so as to further improve the security of theinformation.

In addition, the factory 5 and the management center 3 each include ameans for verifying that apparatus authentication information has beenincluded in the CE apparatus 9.

Details of the First Embodiment

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of amanufacturing/authentication system 1 of CE apparatus. Themanufacturing/authentication system 1 is a system for manufacturing andauthenticating the CE apparatus 9. The figure shows neither a serviceserver for rendering a service to the CE apparatus 9 nor otherapparatus.

The manufacturing/authentication system 1 includes a businessorganization 11, a management center 3, a factory 5, a CE apparatus 9and an apparatus authentication server 8.

The business organization 11 is a company for manufacturing the CEapparatus 9. The business organization 11 is a business enterprise forputting the CE apparatus 9 in the market. Activities of putting the CEapparatus 9 in the market include planning, development and sales of theCE apparatus 9.

The management center 3 is an organization for managing apparatusauthentication information to be included in the CE apparatus 9. Themanagement center 3 also manages issuances of apparatus authenticationinformation and encryption information for the apparatus authenticationinformation.

The factory 5 is an organization for manufacturing the CE apparatus 9 ata request made by the business organization 11. In some cases, thebusiness organization 11 owns the factory 5. In other cases, the factory5 is managed by a third party entrusted by the business organization 11as a factory for manufacturing the CE apparatus 9.

The CE apparatus 9 manufactured at the factory 5 internally includesapparatus authentication information issued by the management center 3.

The apparatus authentication server 8 is a server for receivingapparatus authentication information from the management center 3 aswell as apparatus authentication information from the CE apparatus 9 andauthenticating the CE apparatus 9.

A CE apparatus 9 authenticated by the apparatus authentication server 8is allowed to receive a service rendered by typically a service server.

Next, a process to manufacture the CE apparatus 9 in themanufacturing/authentication system 1 is explained by referring toreference numerals shown in the figure.

(1): First of all, the business organization 11 designs the CE apparatus9 in accordance with a plan. Then, the business organization 11 acquiresinformation used for creating firmware to be installed in the CEapparatus 9 from the management center 3.

This firmware includes a program for including apparatus authenticationinformation in the CE apparatus 9 and a program for driving the CEapparatus 9. The firmware is installed in the CE apparatus 9 at thefactory 5. The business organization 11 also obtains information forincluding apparatus authentication information in the CE apparatus 9from the management center 3.

(2): The business organization 11 requests the factory 5 to manufacturethe CE apparatus 9 and delivers the firmware to be installed in the CEapparatus 9 to the factory 5 by recording the firmware into a CD-ROM(Compact Disc—Read Only Memory) or by transmitting the firmware to thefactory 5 by way of a network.

(3): At the factory 5, after the CE apparatus 9 has been assembled, thefirmware received from the business organization 11 is installed in theCE apparatus 9. Then, the connection means 10 shown in FIG. 1 is linkedto a connector of the CE apparatus 9. Subsequently, the factory 5requests the management center 3 to transmit apparatus authenticationinformation to the factory 5.

(4): At the request made by the factory 5, the management center 3transmits apparatus authentication information to be installed in the CEapparatus 9 to the factory 5 by way of a network. The transmittedapparatus authentication information is encrypted information.

Since the original apparatus authentication information can be obtainedby decrypting the encrypted apparatus authentication information, theencrypted apparatus authentication information can be regarded as asource for generating the original apparatus authentication information.The substance of the apparatus authentication information will bedescribed later in detail.

(5): At the factory 5, the apparatus authentication informationtransmitted by the management center 3 is supplied to the CE apparatus 9by way of the connection means 10. After the apparatus authenticationinformation is decrypted in the CE apparatus 9 by using an encryptionkey included in the firmware installed in the CE apparatus 9, the resultof the decryption process is re-encrypted by using another encryptionkey included in the firmware and stored in a storage medium employed inthe CE apparatus 9.

(6) Then, in accordance with a method to be described later, the factory5 and the management center 3 verify that the apparatus authenticationinformation has correctly been included in the CE apparatus 9. Thefactory 5 can use the result of the verification to report a result ofmanufacturing to the management center 3.

(7): At the factory 5, after the process to assemble the CE apparatus 9and the process to include the apparatus authentication information inthe assembled CE apparatus 9 are completed, the CE apparatus 9 isshipped.

(8): The management center 3 provides the apparatus authenticationinformation of the CE apparatus 9 to the apparatus authentication server8.

(9): The apparatus authentication server 8 requests the CE apparatus 9to transmit the apparatus authentication information to the CE apparatus9, and compares the apparatus authentication information received fromthe management center 3 with the apparatus authentication informationreceived from the CE apparatus 9 in order to authenticate the CEapparatus 9.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of an apparatusauthentication section 99. The apparatus authentication section 99 is afunctional section, which is formed inside the CE apparatus 9 byinstalling the firmware at the factory 5.

The apparatus authentication section 99 includes an authenticationmodule 20, a write module 30, an authentication information memory 40and a main-body identification-information memory 50.

The authentication module 20 is a functional section for providing theapparatus authentication server 8 with a facility for authenticating theCE apparatus 9.

The authentication module 20 has a public key 21 and a peculiar-keygenerator 22 for generating a peculiar key 23. The public key 21 and thepeculiar key 23 are used in transmission of apparatus authenticationinformation to the apparatus authentication server 8.

The peculiar key 23 is a key for encrypting and decrypting apparatusauthentication information stored in the authentication informationmemory 40. Before the peculiar key 23 can be used, the peculiar key 23must be generated in advance dynamically from the peculiar-key generator22 and a MAC address 51.

The MAC address 51 is information peculiar to the CE apparatus 9. Inaddition, the peculiar key 23 is also generated as a key also peculiarto the CE apparatus 9.

In this embodiment, the peculiar key 23 is generated by using the MACaddress 51. In actuality, the peculiar key 23 can be generated by usingany other information as long as the other information is peculiar tothe CE apparatus 9. An example of the other information is the addressof i.Link (IEEE 1394).

That is to say, the peculiar key 23 is generated by using informationpeculiar to the CE apparatus 9 as a key also key peculiar to the CEapparatus 9.

As described above, even if the peculiar-key generator 22 included inthe manufactured CE apparatus 9 is universal information, the generatedpeculiar key 23 varies from CE apparatus 9 to CE apparatus 9. Thus, thepeculiar-key generator 22 can be managed with ease.

The authentication module 20 having the configuration described abovereads out apparatus authentication information from the authenticationinformation memory 40 and decrypts the apparatus authenticationinformation prior to transmission to the apparatus authentication server8 along with an apparatus ID 41.

After being used, the peculiar key 23 is deleted immediately within apredetermined period of time. The predetermined period of time can havea variety of lengths. For example, the predetermined period of time is aperiod between the start of a process to encrypt the apparatusauthentication information and the end of a process carried out by theapparatus authentication section 99 to authenticate the CE apparatus 9.

As described above, this embodiment has a configuration in which thepeculiar key 23 is deleted after being used. However, it is to be notedthat it is not always necessary to delete the peculiar key 23.

The write module 30 is a functional section for writing apparatusauthentication information into the CE apparatus 9 at the factory 5.

The write module 30 has a pre-write key 31, a peculiar-key generator 32,an apparatus-side verification hash function 34 and a server-sideverification hash function 35.

The pre-write key 31 is a key for decrypting encrypted apparatusauthentication information received from the management center 3.

The peculiar-key generator 32 is seed information for generating thepeculiar key 33. The peculiar-key generator 32 is the same as thepeculiar-key generator 22 of the authentication module 20.

The peculiar key 33 is a key for encrypting apparatus authenticationinformation obtained as a result of a decryption process carried out byusing the pre-write key 31. Before using the peculiar key 33, thepeculiar key 33 must be generated in advance dynamically by using thepeculiar-key generator 32 and the MAC address 51. The peculiar key 33 isthe same as the peculiar key 23, which is generated in theauthentication module 20.

The write module 30 having the configuration described above decryptsencrypted apparatus authentication information received from themanagement center 3, re-encrypts the result of the decryption by usingthe peculiar key 33 and stores the re-encrypted apparatus authenticationinformation in the authentication information memory 40.

In this embodiment, by storing apparatus authentication information in astate of being encrypted by using the peculiar key 33 in theauthentication information memory 40, the security of the apparatusauthentication information can be improved.

Note that it is also possible to provide a configuration in whichapparatus authentication information is stored in a storage unit withoutencrypting the apparatus authentication information by using thepeculiar key 33. In this case, since the authentication module 20 doesnot need to decrypt the apparatus authentication information in anauthentication process, it is not necessary to generate the peculiar key23.

The apparatus-side verification hash function 34 is a function used bythe write module 30 to verify that apparatus authentication informationhas been stored properly in the authentication information memory 40. Aswill be described later, the write-module 30 verifies that apparatusauthentication information has been included in the CE apparatus 9 bycomparison of a hash value transmitted from the management center 3 witha hash value generated by using the apparatus-side verification hashfunction 34 as the hash value of the apparatus authenticationinformation.

The server-side verification hash function 35 is a function forgenerating a value to be used by the management center 3 to verify thatapparatus authentication information has been stored properly in theauthentication information memory 40.

As will be described later, the write module 30 transmits a hash value,which is generated by the server-side verification hash function 35 asthe hash value of apparatus authentication information stored in theauthentication information memory 40, to the management center 3.

The management center 3 compares the hash value received from the writemodule 30 with a hash value, which is generated by using a server-sideverification hash value function as the hash value of the issuedapparatus authentication information, in order to verify that apparatusauthentication information has been included in the CE apparatus 9.

As obvious from the above description, the embodiment provides two typesof hash function, i.e, the apparatus-side verification hash function 34for generating a hash value for verification use in the CE apparatus 9and the server-side verification hash function 35 for generating a hashvalue for verification use in the management server 7.

Let us assume for example that the same hash functions are used forverification in the CE apparatus 9 and the management server 7. Also letus assume that a third party returns a hash value transmitted by themanagement server 7 to the CE apparatus 9 back to the management server7 as it is. In this case, it will be difficult for the management server7 to determine whether the received hash value is a hash valuetransmitted by the CE apparatus 9 or the third party.

For the reason described above, the two types of hash function are usedin order to prevent a third party from pretending to be the CE apparatus9.

By the way, a hash function is a function for hashing an electronictext. By hashing an electronic text, it is possible to generate acharacter string peculiar to the text from the text. The generatedstring of characters is referred to as the hash value of the electronictext or a digest message of the text.

The same hash values are obtained from the same electronic texts. Ifeven only a portion of an electronic text is modified, a hash valueobtained from the modified electronic text will be different from thehash value of the original electronic text.

In addition, it is extremely difficult to obtain the original electronictext by carrying out an inverse conversion process on the hash value ofthe text.

As described above, a hash function is a type of function referred to asa one-directional function, which allows a conversion process to becarried out in a forward direction with ease, but makes it extremelydifficult to carry out an inverse conversion process of the hashfunction to obtain the original value from the hash value obtained as aresult of the conversion process carried out in the forward direction.

As described above, both the side verifying secret information and theside holding the secret information to be verified generate a hash valueof the information and compare the generated hash value with a hashvalue received from the other side. In this way, both the sides arecapable of verifying that the two pieces of secret information are equalto each other with the confidential state of the secret information keptas it is.

The authentication information memory 40 is a storage unit for storinginformation to be used for authenticating the CE apparatus 9. The storedinformation includes the apparatus authentication information describedabove.

In the case of the embodiment, the stored information includes theapparatus ID 41 mentioned above and an encryption code 42 including anapparatus ID and a pass phrase.

The apparatus ID 41 is ID information used for identifying the CEapparatus 9. The factory 5 obtains the apparatus ID 41 from anapparatus-ID management organization in advance and stores the apparatusID 41 in the CE apparatus 9.

An (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 including an apparatus ID and a passphrase includes the apparatus ID 41 and an encrypted pass phrase at thetail of the apparatus ID 41. The pass phrase at the tail of theapparatus ID 41 has been encrypted by using the peculiar key 23 or thepeculiar key 33. It is to be noted that the order in which the apparatusID 41 and the pass phrase are arranged may be reversed.

In the following description, notation (information A+information B)denotes information composed of information A and information B placedat the tail of information A. Information obtained as a result of aprocess to encrypt the (information A+information B) is referred to asan encrypted (information A+information+B).

Let us assume for example that the apparatus ID 41: is ‘123’ and thepass phrase is ‘abc’. In this case, the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42including the apparatus ID 41 and the pass phrase is 123abc. A result ofa process to encrypt the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using thepeculiar key 23 or the peculiar key 33 is referred to as an encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

The pass phrase is secret information, which is issued by the managementserver 7 to be included in apparatus authentication information in aprocess to include the apparatus authentication information in the CEapparatus 9 at the factory 5.

In this embodiment, an (apparatus ID+pass phrase) is used as apparatusauthentication information.

By combining a pass phrase with the apparatus ID as described above, theamount of the apparatus authentication information can be increased.Thus, it is difficult for a third party to decrypt the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42. As a result, the security of theapparatus authentication information can be improved.

In addition, by comparing a decrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) with areceived apparatus ID in the CE apparatus 9, it is also possible toverify that a combination of the apparatus ID and the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) is correct.

The main-body identification-information memory 50 is a storage unit forstoring information used for identifying the main body of the CEapparatus 9.

Examples of the information used for identifying the main body of the CEapparatus 9 are a MAC (Media Access Control) address 51 and informationreferred to as i.Link. Used for identifying the CE apparatus 9 in thenetwork, the MAC address 51 is information peculiar to the CE apparatus9.

To put it concretely, the MAC address 51 is a hardware address unique tothe CE apparatus 9. Thus, the MAC address 51 remains unchanged even if,for example, the CE apparatus 9 moves from a location to another in anetwork.

Next, the following description explains a procedure for includingapparatus authentication information in the CE apparatus 9 with theconfiguration described above, a procedure for verifying the includedapparatus authentication information and a procedure for authenticatingthe CE apparatus 9 by using the included apparatus authenticationinformation.

FIG. 4 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a work procedureexecuted at a preparatory stage of including apparatus authenticationinformation in the CE apparatus 9.

First of all, at the first step 10, the business organization 11 sets aproduct plan of the CE apparatus 9. This product planning work iscarried out manually by for example a person in charge of productplanning.

Then, at the next step 12, a business-organization system set in thebusiness organization 11 makes an access to the management server 7 tomake a request for the pre-write key 31 for including apparatusauthentication information in the write module 30 employed in the CEapparatus 9.

The management server 7 has a key table 700 like one shown in FIG. 8.From the key table 700, the management server 7 issues a pre-write key31 and a key identifier for uniquely identifying the pre-write key 31among other pre-write keys. Then, at a step 20, the management server 7transmits the issued pre-write key 31 and the issued key identifier tothe business-organization system.

The business organization 11 can have a configuration for requesting themanagement server 7 to transmit a product code used for identifying thetype of the product and a peculiar-key generator to be described laterto the business organization 11.

The management server 7 manages product codes and peculiar-keygenerators as pairs each consisting of one of the product codes and apeculiar-key generator corresponding to the product code.

At a step 14, the business-organization system creates firmware forreceiving the pre-write key 31 and the key identifier from themanagement server 7 and for storing the pre-write key 31 in the writemodule 30. In addition, the business-organization system includes thepeculiar-key generator in the firmware.

Then, at the next step 16, the business-organization system transmitsthe created firmware, the key identifier and a product code used foridentifying the type of the CE apparatus 9 to a factory system set in atthe factory 5.

At the factory 5, a plurality of CE apparatus 9 identified by theproduct codes is produced. It is to be noted, however, that all theproduced CE apparatus use the same pre-write key 31. For this reason,the created firmware and the key identifier can be transmitted to a pairfactory for producing a plurality of CE apparatus 9 from the firmwareand the key identifier, which form a pair.

The factory system receives these pieces of information from thebusiness-organization system. Then, the factory 5 starts manufacturingCE apparatus 9 identified by the received product code.

At a step 30, the factory system issues a product serial number for theCE apparatus 9 manufactured in this way, that is, for a productmanufactured before inclusion of the firmware.

A product serial number assigned to a CE apparatus 9 is a numberpeculiar to the CE apparatus 9. For example, a product serial number isa number or a barcode printed on a label seal, which is stuck on the CEapparatus 9 so that the product serial number can be referred to from aposition outside the CE apparatus 9.

In the case of this embodiment, the product serial number assigned to aCE apparatus 9 is information used for identifying the CE apparatus 9.It is to be noted, however, that for example, a product code and aproduct serial number can also be used for identifying a CE apparatus 9.

In this case, the apparatus authentication server 8 sticks a productcode and a product serial number on a CE apparatus 9.

That is to say, any information is applicable as long as the informationcan be used for identifying a CE apparatus 9.

Then, at the next step 32, the factory system includes the firmware inthe CE apparatus 9.

The firmware is included in the CE apparatus 9 by supplying the firmwareto the CE apparatus 9 by way of a connector of the CE apparatus 9.

The business organization 11 may deliver the firmware to the factory 5by storing the firmware in a recording medium such as a CD-ROM. Then, atthe factory 5, the firmware is read out from the recording medium to beincluded in the CE apparatus 9.

By inclusion of the firmware into the CE apparatus 9, the apparatusauthentication section 99 shown in FIG. 3 is created inside the CEapparatus 9.

It is to be noted that, in the process to include the firmware into theCE apparatus 9, the factory system stores the apparatus ID 41 obtainedin advance from an apparatus-ID management institution in theauthentication information memory 40. At this stage, however, the(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 has not been stored in the authenticationinformation memory 40.

FIG. 5 shows a flowchart representing a procedure for includingapparatus authentication information into a CE apparatus 9, that is, aprocedure for storing an (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 in theauthentication information memory 40.

It is to be noted that the process of including apparatus authenticationinformation into a CE apparatus 9 as described below is carried out withthe connection means 10 connected to the CE apparatus 9.

The factory system has a key-identifier management table 500 like oneshown in FIG. 8. The key-identifier management table 500 is a table formanaging product codes representing products with key identifiersobtained from the business-organization system by associating theproduct codes with their respective key identifiers.

At a step 40, the factory system makes an access to the managementserver 7 in order to make a request for issuance of a pass phrase. Inaddition, the factory system transmits the apparatus ID 41 obtainedearlier and a key identifier stored in the key-identifier managementtable 500 as the key identifier of the CE apparatus 9 to the managementserver 7.

At a step 50, the management server 7 issues a pass phrase at therequest received from the factory system as a request for issuance ofthe pass phrase.

It is to be noted that a pass phrase is secret information created as acharacter string including characters, numbers and/or symbols. A passphrase is information of the same type as a password.

A relatively short character string serving as secret information isreferred to as a password. On the other hand, a relatively longcharacter string serving as secret information is referred to as a passphrase. For a third party, the longer the encrypted string ofcharacters, the more difficult the string to decrypt.

Then, the management server 7 obtains a pre-write key 31 associated withthe key identifier, which has been received from the factory system,from the key table 700 shown in FIG. 8.

Subsequently, at the next step 52, the management server 7 generates an(apparatus ID+pass phrase) from the apparatus ID 41 received from thefactory system and the pass phrase generated at the step 50, encryptingthe (apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using the pre-write key 31 obtainedearlier to produce an encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

The encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) is used as apparatusauthentication information.

Much like the CE apparatus 9, the management server 7 has anapparatus-side verification hash function-34 and a server-sideverification hash function 35. Then, at the next step 54, theapparatus-side verification hash function 34 is used for generating thehash value of the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) generated earlier. The hashvalue of the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) is referred to as a first hashvalue.

The first hash value is used in the CE apparatus 9 in determiningwhether or not the apparatus authentication information has beenincluded properly.

It is to be noted that the server-side verification hash function 35generates a hash value to be used in the management server 7 indetermining whether or not the apparatus authentication information hasbeen included properly in the management server 7.

Then, at the next step 56, the management server 7 transmits theapparatus ID 41, the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 generatedabove and the first hash value to the factory system. In this case, themanagement server 7 serves as a source-information-providing means.

It is to be noted that the management server 7 also has an issuedapparatus authentication information table 702 shown in FIG. 8. When themanagement server 7 transmits the apparatus ID 41, the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 and the first hash value to the factorysystem, the management server 7 also updates the issued apparatusauthentication information table 702.

Thus, the issued pass phrase can be associated with an apparatus ID 41and a key identifier.

At a step 42, the factory system receives these pieces of informationfrom the management server 7 and supplies them to the CE apparatus 9 byway of the connection means 10.

At a step 60, the write module 30 employed in the CE apparatus 9receives these pieces of information. The encrypted (apparatus ID+passphrase) 42 corresponds to the source information. Thus, in this case,the write module 30 serves as a source-information acquisition means.

The first hash value corresponds to a result of a conversion processcarried out on the apparatus authentication information by using aone-directional function. Thus, the write module 30 has aconversion-value acquisition means.

Then, at the next step 62, the write module 30 decrypts the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using the pre-write key 31.

By carrying out the decryption process, the CE apparatus 9 is capable ofobtaining the apparatus authentication information received from themanagement center 3. In this case, the apparatus authenticationinformation is the (apparatus ID+pass phrase).

As described above, the write module 30 has generation means forgenerating apparatus authentication information from source information.

The CE apparatus 9 may save the decrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) ina memory as it is. In the case of this embodiment, however, the(apparatus. ID+pass phrase) is re-encrypted before being stored in thememory in order to enhance the security of the apparatus authenticationinformation.

In order to carry out the re-encryption process, first of all, the writemodule 30 generates a peculiar key 33 from a MAC address 51 and apeculiar-key generator 32 at the following step 64.

This step is executed for the purpose of obtaining an encryption keypeculiar to the CE apparatus 9. For example, this step is executed forthe purpose of obtaining the peculiar key 33 by using the MAC address51. However, the purpose of this step is not limited to this example.The step can also be executed by using any information as far as theinformation is peculiar to the CE apparatus 9. An example, a productserial number can be used.

In addition, as will be described later, the authentication module 20 isalso capable of generating the same encryption key as the peculiar key33. Thus, the write module 30 and the authentication module 20 both havea key generation means.

Then, at the next step 66, the write module 30 encrypts the (apparatusID+pass phrase) by using the generated peculiar key 33 to generate anencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

It is to be noted that, since the encryption key used in there-encryption-process is different from the encryption key used in theencryption process, the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 isdifferent from the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) received fromthe management server 7.

Then, at the next step 68, the write module 30 supplies the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 to the authentication information memory40. Subsequently, at a step 70, the authentication information memory 40stores the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 therein.

It is to be noted that, in the case of a configuration in which theapparatus authentication section 99 is supposed to delete the peculiarkey 33, the peculiar key 33 is deleted immediately by key deletion meansafter being used.

As described above, the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 ispeculiar to the CE apparatus 9 and a result of an encryption processusing the peculiar key 33, which is generated dynamically. Thus, thesecurity of the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 can be improved.

The authentication information memory 40 serves as a storage means.

In accordance with the procedure described above, the apparatusauthentication information issued by the management server 7 can beincluded in the CE apparatus 9.

In addition, since the apparatus authentication information is suppliedto the CE apparatus 9 in a state of being encrypted as it is, it ispossible to prevent in advance the apparatus authentication informationfrom being leaked out at the factory 5. It is thus possible to improvethe security required at the time the apparatus authenticationinformation is included in the CE apparatus 9.

On the top of that, since the apparatus authentication information isstored in the CE apparatus 9 in a state of being re-encrypted by usingan encryption key peculiar to the CE apparatus 9, it is possible toprevent in advance the apparatus authentication information from beingleaked out from the CE apparatus 9 after the CE apparatus 9 is shipped.It is thus possible to improve the security required after shipping theCE apparatus 9.

FIG. 6 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureexecuted by the management center 3 and the factory 5 as a procedure forverifying that apparatus authentication information has been includedproperly into the CE apparatus 9.

This procedure is executed with the connection means 10 alreadyconnected to the CE apparatus 9. Normally, the procedure is executedautomatically after the factory system includes the apparatusauthentication information in the CE apparatus 9.

First of all, at a step 90, the write module 30 employed in theapparatus authentication section 99 reads out the encrypted (apparatusID+pass phrase) 42 from the authentication information memory 40. Atthis step, the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 is transferredfrom the authentication information memory 40 to the write module 30.

Then, at a step 100, the write module 30 generates a peculiar key 33from the peculiar-key generator 32 and the MAC address 51. Subsequently,at the next step 102, the write module 30 decrypts the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using the peculiar key 33.

Then, at the next step 104, the write module 30 generates the hash valueof the decrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using the apparatus-sideverification hash function 34. The hash value of the decrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) is referred to as a first hash value.

Subsequently, at the next step 106, the write module 30 compares thefirst hash value received from the management server 7 with the hashvalue generated at the step 104 to produce a result of determination asto whether or not both the hash values are equal to each other.

Thus, the write module 30 has conversion-value computation means forcomputing the first hash value and a determination means.

A determination result indicating that both the hash values are equal toeach other also proves that the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) generated bythe management server 7 matches the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) stored inthe authentication information memory 40.

Then, at the next step 108, the write module 30 generates the hash valueof the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using the server-side verificationhash function 35. The hash value of the (apparatus ID+pass phrase)generated by using the server-side verification hash function 35 isreferred to as a second hash value.

Subsequently, at the next step 110, the write module 30 reads out theapparatus ID 41 from the authentication information memory 40,transmitting a determination result obtained at the step 106 as theresult of comparison of both the first hash values, the apparatus ID 41,and the second hash value to the factory system. The second hash valueis also transmitted to the management server 7.

As is obvious from the above description, the write module 30 has theconversion-value computation means and a conversion-value-providingmeans.

On the basis of the comparison result received from the CE apparatus 9,the factory is capable of knowing whether or not the apparatusauthentication information has been properly included in the CEapparatus 9.

If the first hash values are not equal to each other, on the other hand,the apparatus ID 41 is discarded and an attempt is made to again includeapparatus authentication information in the CE apparatus 9 by using anew apparatus ID.

The apparatus ID 41 resulting in information inclusion ending in afailure can also be reutilized. In the case of the embodiment, however,a apparatus ID 41 resulting in information inclusion ending in a failureis discarded to prevent a plurality of CE apparatus 9 having the sameapparatus ID from being sold in the market mistakenly.

It is to be noted that, in the conventional manufacturing process, inorder to maintain the confidentiality of apparatus authenticationinformation, after the apparatus authentication information has oncebeen included in a CE apparatus 9, it is difficult to determine whetheror not the apparatus authentication information has been properlyincluded in the CE apparatus 9 and, in some case, the fact that theapparatus authentication information has been properly included in theCE apparatus 9 is not verified.

In the case of this embodiment, however, hash values of apparatusauthentication information are compared with each other in the CEapparatus 9. It is thus possible to determine whether or not theapparatus authentication information has been properly included in theCE apparatus 9 inside the CE apparatus 9 by keeping the apparatusauthentication information confidential as it is.

After verifying that the apparatus authentication information has beenproperly included in the CE apparatus 9, at a step 120, the factorysystem transmits the apparatus ID 41 and the second hash value, whichhave been received from the CE apparatus 9, to the management server 7along with a product serial number assigned to the CE apparatus 9.

At a step S130, the management server 7 receives these pieces ofinformation from the factory system and searches the issued apparatusauthentication information table 702 shown in FIG. 8 for a pass phrasecorresponding to the received apparatus ID 41.

Thus, the management server 7 has conversion-value acquisition means foracquiring the second hash value.

Then, the management server 7 generates an (apparatus ID+pass phrase)from the apparatus ID 41 and the pass phrase found in the searchoperation, producing a second hash value of the (apparatus ID+passphrase) by using the server-side verification hash function 35. Thus,the management server 7 has a conversion-value computation means.

Subsequently, at the next step 132, the management server 7 compares thesecond hash value-received from the factory system with the generatedsecond hash value in order to determine whether or not both the secondhash values are equal to each other. Thus, the management server 7 has adetermination means.

If both the second hash values are found equal to each other, themanagement server 7 determines that the apparatus authenticationinformation has been successfully included in the CE apparatus 9.

If both the second hash values are found unequal to each other, on theother hand, the management server 7 determines that the apparatusauthentication information has not been successfully included in the CEapparatus 9.

The management server 7 has an apparatus authentication table 704 likeone shown in FIG. 8. The apparatus authentication table 704 is a tablefor storing apparatus IDs 41, pass phrases and product serial numbers byassociating the apparatus IDs 41, the pass phrases and the productserial numbers with each other.

At a step 134, the management server 7 stores the apparatus ID 41, thepass phrase and the product serial number in the apparatusauthentication table 704 if both the second hash values are found equalto each other.

It is to be noted that the apparatus authentication table 704 issupplied to the apparatus authentication server 8 to be used by theapparatus authentication server 8 in authenticating the CE apparatus 9.Thus, the management server 7 serves as apparatus authenticationinformation providing means in this case.

Next, at a step 136, the management server 7 adds a date, on which datawas received from the factory system, to the data. The data receivedfrom the factory system is the apparatus ID 41, the product serialnumber and the second hash value. Then, the management server 7 puts adigital signature used as a secret key on the dated data beforetransmitting the dated data to the factory. In this case, the managementserver 7 serves as a determination-result transmission means.

At a step 122, the factory system serving as a source informationinclusion main organization receives the dated data from the managementserver 7 and confirms that the apparatus authentication information hasbeen included in the CE apparatus 9 properly.

In this way, the factory system is capable of confirming that theapparatus ID 41, the product serial number and the second hash valuehave been received by the management server 7. The apparatus ID 41, theproduct serial number and the second hash value can be regarded as amanufacturing result.

Then, the factory 5 ships the CE apparatus 9 completing themanufacturing process.

FIG. 7 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureadopted by the apparatus authentication server 8 as a procedure forauthenticating a CE apparatus 9.

First of all, at a step 140, the authentication module 20 employed inthe apparatus authentication section 99 as shown in FIG. 3 reads out theencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 from the authenticationinformation memory 40. Thus, the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 istransferred from the authentication information memory 40 to theauthentication module 20.

Then, at a step 150, the authentication module 20 generates a peculiarkey 23 by using the peculiar-key generator 22 and the MAC address 51.

Subsequently, at the next step 152, the authentication module 20decrypts the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using thepeculiar key 23 to obtain a (apparatus ID+pass phrase) and transmits the(apparatus ID+pass phrase) to the apparatus authentication server 8 atthe next step 154. Thus, the authentication module 20 has an apparatusauthentication information transmission means.

It is to be noted that a communication path between the CE apparatus 9and the apparatus authentication server 8 is a path assuring security ofexchanged data by using an encryption technology such as an SSL (SecureSocket Layer).

At a step 160, the apparatus authentication server 8 receives the(apparatus ID+pass phrase) from the CE apparatus 9 and decrypts the(apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using a secret key corresponding to thepublic key 21. Then, the apparatus authentication server 8 compares thedecrypted pass phrase with the pass phrase stored in the apparatusauthentication table 704 received from the management center 3 in orderto authenticate the CE apparatus 9.

Then, at the next step 162, the apparatus authentication server 8identifies the product serial number of the CE apparatus 9 from theapparatus authentication table 704.

This step is the end of the procedure for authenticating the CEapparatus.

FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a typical hardware configuration of the CEapparatus 9.

A CPU (Central Processing Unit) 121 is a central processing section forcarrying out various kinds of processing by execution of programs storedin advance in a ROM (Read Only Memory) 122 or programs loaded from astorage section 128 into a RAM. (Random Access Memory) 123.

The ROM 122 is a memory used for storing basic programs necessary forexecution of functions of the CE apparatus 9 and storing data such asparameters.

The RAM 123 is a memory used as a working area required by the CPU 121for execution of the various kinds of processing.

The storage section 128 is a unit used for storing other programsnecessary for execution of functions of the CE apparatus 9 and storingdata. Examples of the storage section 128 are a hard disk and asemiconductor memory.

The firmware created in business organization 11 is stored in thestorage section 128 at the factory 5. The CPU 121 executes the firmwareto generate a variety of configuration elements shown in FIG. 3 aselements of the apparatus authentication section 99.

The other programs stored in the storage section 128 include an OS(Operating System) for inputting and outputting a file, controllingcomponents of the CE apparatus 9 and carrying out basic functions.

The CPU 121, the ROM 122 and the RAM 123 are connected to each other bya bus 124. This bus 124 is also connected to an input/output interface125.

The input/output interface 125 is connected to an input section 126, anoutput section 127, the storage section 128 cited above and acommunication section 129. The input section 126 includes a keyboard anda mouse whereas the output section 127 includes a display unit and aspeaker. The display unit can be a CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) display unitor an LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) unit. The storage section 128typically includes a hard disk. The communication section 129 has amodem or a terminal adaptor.

The communication section 129 is a functional unit for carrying outcommunication processing with other apparatus through a network. Forexample, the communication section 129 is connected to the connectionmeans 10 to receive apparatus authentication information or connected tothe apparatus authentication server 8 to carry out communications for aprocess to authenticate the CE apparatus 9.

If necessary, the input/output interface 125 is also connected to adrive 140 on which a recording medium is properly mounted. The recordingmedium can be a magnetic disk 141, an optical disk 142, amagneto-optical disk 143 or a memory card 144. As described above, acomputer program to be executed by the CPU 121 is loaded from thestorage section 128 into the RAM 123 if necessary.

It is to be noted that, since the configurations of the managementserver 7 and apparatus authentication server 8 are basically the same asthe configuration of the CE apparatus 9, the explanations of theconfigurations of the management server 7 and apparatus authenticationserver 8 are not given.

In accordance with the first embodiment described above, the (apparatusID+pass phrase) required in the process to authenticate a CE apparatus 9as apparatus authentication information can be transmitted from themanagement-server 7 to the CE apparatus 9 with a high degree of safety.In addition, the factory 5 and the management server 7 are capable ofverifying that the apparatus authentication information has beencorrectly included in the CE apparatus 9.

Effects provided by the first embodiment described above are explainedby comparing the embodiment with the conventional system as follows.

(1): In the conventional system, since the (apparatus ID+pass phrase)used as apparatus authentication information is a clear text supplied tothe CE apparatus 9, it is quite within the bounds of possibility that aworker of the factory 5 or another person sees the apparatusauthentication information either intentionally or not. In the case ofthis embodiment, on the other hand, the problem is solved by supplyingthe (apparatus ID+pass phrase) to the CE apparatus 9 in a state of beingencrypted as it is.

(2): In the conventional system, even if the apparatus authenticationinformation is encrypted before being transmitted to the factory 5, forexample, the method for including apparatus authentication informationinto the CE apparatus 9 varies from product to product and from factoryto factory, making it impossible to provide a uniform technique. It isthus quite within the bounds of possibility that dispersions in securitylevel are resulted in. In the case of this embodiment, on the otherhand, a common method for including apparatus authentication informationinto the CE apparatus 9 is adopted to reduce the number of dispersionsin security level.

(3): In the case of the conventional system, an encryption key may beleaked out and affect another CE apparatus 9. In the case of thisembodiment, on the other hand, a peculiar key 23 is generated for everyCE apparatus 9 as a key peculiar to the CE apparatus 9 for which thepeculiar key 23 is generated. Thus, even if a peculiar key 23 is leakedout, the peculiar key 23 does not affect another CE apparatus 9.

As for the pre-write key 31, the effect range can be limited bygenerating the pre-write key 31 for each product or for every period oftime.

(4): In the case of the conventional system, it is difficult to verifythat apparatus authentication information has been included correctlyinto the CE apparatus 9 at the factory 5 or the management center 3serving as an originator issuing the apparatus authenticationinformation. In the case of this embodiment, on the other hand, by usingpeculiar information such as a hash value, it is possible to verify thatapparatus authentication information has been included correctly in theCE apparatus 9 at the factory 5 or the management center 3.

(5): In the case of the conventional system, it is difficult for thefactory 5 to verify that the management center 3 has correctly receiveda report on a result of manufacturing. In the case of this embodiment,on the other hand, the management server 7 adds a date to data receivedfrom the factory system and puts a digital signature on the dated databefore transmitting the dated data to the factory system.

(6): In the case of the conventional system, it is difficult to useother information such as an electronic certificate as apparatusauthentication information. In the case of this embodiment, on the otherhand, the present invention can be applied to an authentication methodusing an electronic certificate.

In the case of the embodiment, as an example, apparatus authenticationinformation is transmitted to the factory 5 by way of a network andsupplied to the CE apparatus 9 through the connection means 10. It is tobe noted, however, that since the apparatus authentication informationis supplied to the CE apparatus 9 in a state of being encrypted, it isalso possible to provide a configuration in which the apparatusauthentication information is recorded onto a storage medium such as aCD-ROM and the storage medium is then delivered to the factory 5 so thatthe factory 5 is capable of transferring the apparatus authenticationinformation from the medium to the CE apparatus 9.

In addition, in the case of the embodiment, as an example, there isprovided a configuration in which an encrypted (apparatus ID+passphrase) received from the management server 7 is decrypted by using apre-write key 31 before being stored in the authentication informationmemory 40. However, it is also possible to provide another configurationin which an encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) received from themanagement server 7 is stored in the authentication information memory40 right away without being decrypted and decrypted by using a pre-writekey only before being used in an authentication process.

Next, a second embodiment is explained.

Outline of the Second Embodiment

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing a second embodiment in asimple manner.

In the case of the embodiment, source information serving as the sourcefor generating apparatus authentication information is converted intothe apparatus authentication information by using the same logic in themanagement server 7 and the CE apparatus 9 in a process to generate theapparatus authentication information. For example, the sourceinformation is encrypted to generate the apparatus authenticationinformation in the same encryption process using the same encryption keyin the management server 7 and the CE apparatus 9.

First of all, the management server 7 transmits the source informationto the factory 5 and converts the source information into apparatusauthentication information in a process to generate the apparatusauthentication information.

At the factory 5, on the other hand, the source information is suppliedto the CE apparatus 9 by way of the connection means 10. Then, the CEapparatus 9 converts the received source information into apparatusauthentication information.

As is obvious from the above description, the management server 7 andthe CE apparatus 9 are thus capable of sharing the same apparatusauthentication information.

In addition, even if the source information is leaked out to anotherperson, the person will not be capable of knowing the apparatusauthentication information unless the person knows the logic forconverting the source information into the apparatus authenticationinformation.

As described above, since the apparatus authentication information isgenerated by an internal section in the CE apparatus 9, it is possibleto prevent the apparatus authentication information from being output inthe form of a plain text at the factory 5.

Details of the Second Embodiment

The configuration of the manufacturing/authentication system 1 is thesame as the configuration shown in FIG. 2 as the configuration accordingto the first embodiment, and the configuration of the apparatusauthentication section 99 is the same as the configuration shown in FIG.3 as the configuration according to the first embodiment. Thus, theexplanations of these configurations are not repeated.

In addition, every configuration element employed in the secondembodiment as a configuration identical with its counterpart employed inthe first embodiment is explained by denoting the configuration elementby the same reference numeral as the counterpart.

In the following description, methods of including apparatusauthentication information into a CE apparatus 9, verifying theinclusion, and authenticating the CE apparatus 9 are explained byreferring to flowcharts.

It is to be noted that, since preparation for inclusion of apparatusauthentication information into a CE apparatus 9 is the same as that ofthe first embodiment, the explanation with reference to FIG. 4 is notrepeated.

Much like the first embodiment, the management server 7 has a key table706 like one shown in FIG. 14. The key table 706 is a table used formanaging key identifiers and pre-write keys 31 by associating the keyidentifiers and the pre-write keys 31 with each other.

FIG. 11 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forincluding apparatus authentication information into the CE apparatus 9.

In the procedure, the CE apparatus 9 has already been assembled and theconnection means 10 has been linked to a connector of the connectionmeans 10.

First of all, at a step 200, the factory system requests the managementserver 7 to issue a pass phrase and transmits a apparatus ID 41 obtainedin advance from an apparatus-ID management organization to themanagement server 7.

It is to be noted the apparatus ID 41 is also stored in theauthentication information memory 40.

At a step 210, the management server 7 issues a pass phrase in responseto the request made by the factory system.

The management server 7 also has an issued apparatus authenticationinformation table 708 like one shown in FIG. 14. The issued apparatusauthentication information table 708 is a table used for storingapparatus IDs 41 received from the factory system and pass phrasesissued for the apparatus. IDs 41 by associating the apparatus IDs 41 andthe pass phrases with each other.

Then, at the next step 212, after issuing the pass phrase, themanagement server 7 associates the pass phrase with the receivedapparatus ID 41, storing the pass phrase and the received apparatus ID41 in the issued apparatus authentication information table 708.

Subsequently, at the next step 214, the management server 7 generates an(apparatus ID+pass phrase) from the apparatus ID 41 and the issued passphrase, transmitting the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) to the factorysystem.

The (apparatus ID+pass phrase) will become source information forgenerating apparatus authentication information.

At a step 202, the factory system receives the (apparatus ID+passphrase) from the management server 7. Then, at the next step 204, thefactory system supplies the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) to the CEapparatus 9 by way of the connection means 10.

At a step 220, the write module 30 employed in the CE apparatus 9receives the (apparatus ID+pass phrase). Then, at the next step 222, thewrite module 30 encrypts the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) by using thepre-write key 31 to generate an encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

In the case of this embodiment, the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) is usedas the source information in an encryption process for generating the(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42, which is used as the apparatusauthentication information.

That is to say, the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) is converted into theencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 obtained as a result of aconversion process adopting a conversion technique using the pre-writekey 31. The encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 is then-used as theapparatus authentication information.

Subsequently, at the next step 224, the write module 30 generates apeculiar key 33 from a peculiar-key generator 32 and a MAC address 51.Then, at the next step 226, the write module 30 re-encrypts theencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using the generated peculiarkey 33.

This is because, in the case of this embodiment, the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 itself is used as the apparatusauthentication information. Thus, by holding the encrypted (apparatusID+pass phrase) 42 in the CE apparatus 9 in a state of being furtherencrypted, the security of the apparatus authentication information canbe further enhanced.

In the following description, the encrypted (information A+informationB) put in a state of being further encrypted is referred to as are-encrypted (information A+information B).

In this particular case, the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 putin a state of being further encrypted is referred to as a re-encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a. Subsequently, at the next step 228, thewrite module 30 writes the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 ain the authentication information memory 40. Then, at the next step 230,the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a is stored in theauthentication information memory 40.

As described above, in the case of this embodiment, the apparatus ID 41and the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a are stored in theauthentication information memory 40.

FIG. 12 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureexecuted by the management center 3 and the factory 5 to verify thatapparatus authentication information has been included properly in a CEapparatus 9.

This procedure is executed with the connection means 10 already linkedto a connector of the CE apparatus 9. Normally, the procedure isexecuted automatically after the factory system included the apparatusauthentication information in the CE apparatus 9.

First of all, at a step 240, the write module 30 reads out there-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a from the authenticationinformation memory 40. Thus, the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase)42 a is transferred from the authentication information memory 40 to thewrite module 30.

Then, at a step 250, the write module 30 generates a peculiar key 33from the peculiar-key generator 32 and the MAC address 51. Subsequently,at the next step 252, the write module 30 decrypts the re-encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a by using the peculiar key 33 to generatean encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

Then, at a step 254, the write module 30 generates a second hash valuefrom the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using theserver-side verification hash function 35 and transmits the second hashvalue to the factory system at the next step 256.

In the case of the first embodiment, a second hash value is generatedfrom an (apparatus ID+pass phrase). In the case of the secondembodiment, on the other hand, a second hash value is generated from anencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.

It is to be noted that, in the case of the second embodiment, the firsthash value is not used.

At a step 260, the factory system adds an apparatus ID 41, a productserial number and a key identifier to the second hash value receivedfrom the CE apparatus 9, transmitting the apparatus ID 41, the productserial number, the key identifier and the second hash value to themanagement server 7.

At a step 270, the management server 7 searches the issued apparatusauthentication information table 708 shown in FIG. 14 for a pass phrasecorresponding to the apparatus ID 41 received from the factory system asa pass phrase issued to the CE apparatus 9.

Then, at the next step 272, the management server 7 searches the keytable 706 for a pre-write key 31 corresponding to the key identifierreceived from the factory system as a pre-write key 31 equal to the onestored in the CE apparatus 9.

Subsequently, at the next step 274, the management server 7 generates an(apparatus ID+pass phrase) from the apparatus ID 41 received from thefactory system and the pass phrase obtained in the search processcarried out at the step 270, encrypting the generated (apparatus ID+passphrase) by using the pre-write key 31 obtained in the search processcarried out at the step 272 to generate an encrypted (apparatus ID+passphrase) 42.

Then, at the next step 276, the management server 7 generates a secondhash value from the generated encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 byusing the server-side verification-hash function 35.

Subsequently, at the next step 278, the management server 7 compares thesecond hash value generated at the step 276 with the second hash valuereceived from the factory system in order to verify that the apparatusauthentication information has been properly included in the CEapparatus 9.

The management server 7 has an apparatus authentication table 710 likeone shown in FIG. 14. The apparatus authentication table 710 is a tableused for storing apparatus IDs 41, encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase)s42 each used as apparatus authentication information, product serialnumbers and key identifiers by associating the elements with each other.

Then, at the next step 280, knowing that the apparatus authenticationinformation has been included in the CE apparatus 9 properly from aresult of the comparison of the second hash values with each other, themanagement server 7 stores the apparatus ID 41, the encrypted (apparatusID+pass phrase) 42, the product serial number and the key identifier inthe apparatus authentication table 710 by associating the elements witheach other in dependence on the result of the comparison of the secondhash values.

It is to be noted that the apparatus authentication table 710 issupplied to the apparatus application server 8 to be used in a processto authenticate a CE apparatus 9.

Subsequently, at the next step 282, the management server 7 adds a date,on which the data was received from the factory system, to the data andputs a digital signature on the dated data by using a secret key beforetransmitting the dated data to the factory system.

At a step 262, the factory system verifies the digital signature inorder to confirm that the apparatus authentication information hasproperly included in the CE apparatus 9.

After verifying the fact that the apparatus authentication informationhas been included in the CE apparatus 9, the CE apparatus 9 is shippedfrom the factory 5 to the market.

FIG. 13 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedureadopted by the apparatus authentication server 8 as a procedure forauthenticating a CE apparatus 9.

First of all, at a step 290, the authentication module 20 employed inthe apparatus authentication section 99 as shown in FIG. 3 reads out there-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a from the authenticationinformation memory 40. Thus, the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase)42 a is transferred from the authentication information memory 40 to theauthentication module 20.

Then, at a step 300, the authentication module 20 generates a peculiarkey 23 by using the peculiar-key generator 22 and the MAC address 51.

Subsequently, at the next step 302, the authentication module 20decrypts the re-encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 a by using thepeculiar key 23 to generate an encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42.Then, at the next step 304, the authentication module 20 encrypts theencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using the public key 21 priorto transmission to the apparatus authentication server 8 along with theapparatus ID 41.

At a step 310, the apparatus authentication server 8 receives theencrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 from the CE apparatus 9 anddecrypts the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 by using a secretkey corresponding to the public key 21. Then, the apparatusauthentication server 8 searches the apparatus authentication table 710received from the management center 3 for an encrypted (apparatusID+pass phrase) 42 corresponding to the apparatus ID 41 as the encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 of the CE apparatus 9. The apparatusauthentication server 8 then compares the encrypted (apparatus ID+passphrase) 42 found in the search process with the received encrypted(apparatus ID+pass phrase) 42 in order to authenticate the CE apparatus9.

Subsequently, at the next step 312, the apparatus authentication server8 searches the apparatus authentication table 710 for a product serialnumber corresponding to the apparatus ID 41 as the product serial numberof the CE apparatus 9.

Thus, by execution of the procedure described above, the CE apparatus 9can be authenticated.

Effects provided by the second embodiment described above are explainedby comparing the embodiment with the conventional system having problemsas follows.

(1): In the case of the conventional system, in order to request themanagement server 7 to transmit apparatus authentication information, itis necessary to make a request for an encrypted pass phrasecorresponding to the pre-write key 31 stored in the CE apparatus 9.However, in the case of this embodiment, it is possible to request themanagement server 7 to transmit an (apparatus ID+pass phrase) withoutbeing aware of the pre-write key 31 stored in the CE apparatus 9.

(2): In the case of the conventional system, when the process tomanufacture the CE apparatus 9 is stopped, an acquired (apparatusID+pass phrase) becomes wasteful. However, in the case of thisembodiment, an (apparatus ID+pass phrase) acquired from the managementserver 7 can be utilized by any CE apparatus. Thus, if an (apparatusID+pass phrase) is left over, the (apparatus ID+pass phrase) can beprovided to another CE apparatus 9.

(3): In the case of the conventional system, if the manufacturing lineof a CE apparatus 9 is taken into consideration, free setting isimpossible for each pre-write key 31. In the case of this embodiment, onthe other hand, each pre-write key 31 can be set without worrying aboutthe manufacturing line.

In the case of this embodiment, apparatus authentication information isgenerated in the management server 7 from source information andsupplied to the apparatus authentication server 8. In this case, thesource information is an (apparatus ID+pass phrase) and the apparatusauthentication information is the encrypted (apparatus ID+pass phrase).However, it is to be noted, that the scope of the present invention isnot limited to such a configuration. For example, it is possible toprovide a configuration in which the management server 7 provides sourceinformation to the apparatus authentication server 8, which thengenerates apparatus authentication information from the sourceinformation.

Third Embodiment

Next, a third embodiment is explained.

This embodiment updates an application including keys for encrypting anddecrypting apparatus authentication information. In the followingdescription, the application is referred to as an apparatusauthentication client.

The apparatus authentication client is installed in a CE apparatus or apersonal computer, forming the same modules as those of the apparatusauthentication section 99 shown in FIG. 3. A usage limit and others areset for a public key corresponding to the public key 21. In some cases,it is necessary to update the public key to a new one.

In the case of the conventional system, it is necessary to replace allapparatus authentication clients with new ones when the public key isupdated.

In the case of this embodiment, by replacing a module included in theapparatus authentication client as a module corresponding to oneincluded in the apparatus authentication section 99, a public keyincluded in the module is updated.

By taking a case in which the apparatus authentication section 99 of theCE apparatus 9 is updated as an example, the following descriptionexemplifies an updating procedure represented by a flowchart of FIG. 15.

It is to be noted that an updating server is a server for rendering aservice to update an apparatus authentication-client. The updatingserver and the apparatus authentication server synchronously hold arelation between product codes, which are each used for identifying thetype of a product, and peculiar-key generators.

An object apparatus is a terminal having an apparatus authenticationclient to be updated.

First of all, at a step 400, the object apparatus makes an access to theupdating server in order to make a request for updating of a module,which is the apparatus authentication section 99 included in theapparatus authentication client.

At a step 410, the updating server makes a request for authentication ofthe object apparatus in response to the request made by the objectapparatus.

At a step 402, the object apparatus makes an access to the apparatusauthentication server. Then, at a step 422, the apparatus authenticationserver authenticates the object apparatus.

At that time, the apparatus authentication server issues a one-time IDand stores the one-time ID in a memory by associating the one-time IDwith a product code assigned to the object apparatus. The apparatusauthentication server then transmits this one-time ID to the objectapparatus.

At a step 404, the object apparatus receives the one-time ID from theapparatus authentication server and transmits the one-time ID to theupdating server.

At a step 412, the updating server receives the one-time ID from theobject apparatus and transmits the one-time ID to the apparatusauthentication server.

At a step 424, the apparatus authentication server receives the one-timeID from the updating server and transmits a product code associated withthe one-time ID to the updating server.

The updating server receives the product code from the apparatusauthentication server and identifies an apparatus authentication clientto be updated from the product code.

Then, at steps 406 and 414, the updating server communicates with theobject apparatus in order to confirm a module to be downloaded by, forexample, collating the version of the apparatus authentication client onthe object-apparatus side with the most recent version.

Then, at a step 416, the updating server searches for a peculiar-keygenerator corresponding to the product code. Subsequently, at the nextstep 418, the updating server generates a module corresponding to thepeculiar-key generator.

At that time, a public key included in the module is the most recentone.

Then, at the next step 420, the updating server downloads the generatedmodule to the object apparatus.

At a step 408, the object apparatus saves the downloaded module.

As described above, in the case of this embodiment, by updating themodule, the public key included in the module can be updated.

Fourth Embodiment

In the case of the first embodiment, the CE apparatus 9 generates asecond hash value, transmitting the second hash value to the managementserver 7, and the management server 7 verifies the second hash value. Inthe case of the fourth embodiment, on the other hand, the CE apparatus 9transmits a result of a process to verify a first hash value to themanagement server 7.

FIG. 16 is a diagram showing a typical configuration of an apparatusauthentication section 99 a. Every configuration element employed in thefourth embodiment as a configuration identical with its counterpartemployed in the first embodiment is explained by denoting theconfiguration element by the same reference numeral as the counterpartand the explanation of the element is not given.

The apparatus authentication section 99 a has an authenticationinformation write verification module 36 for transmitting the result ofa process to verify a first hash value to the management server 7.

Since it is not necessary to transmit a second hash value to themanagement server 7, a write module 30 a does not include theserver-side verification hash function 35 shown in FIG. 3.

The write module 30 a is a unit for comparing a first hash valuereceived from the management center 3 with a first hash value generatedby using the apparatus-side verification hash function 34 and outputsthe result of comparison to the authentication information writeverification module 36.

The authentication information write verification module 36 furtheracquires an apparatus ID, transmitting the apparatus ID and a result ofverification to the factory system by way of the connection means 10.

The factory system passes on the apparatus ID and the result ofverification along with a serial number to the management server 7employed in the management center 3. From the result of verification,the management center 3 is capable of confirming that apparatusauthentication information has been included in a CE apparatus 9.

FIG. 17 shows a flowchart referred to in explanation of a procedure forverifying that apparatus authentication information has been includedproperly into a CE apparatus in this embodiment.

Every process included in the procedure as a process identical with itscounterpart in the flowchart shown in FIG. 6 is denoted by the same stepnumber as the counterpart and its explanation is not given orsimplified.

Steps 90 to 106 are identical with their respective counterparts in thefirst embodiment.

At the step 106, however, the write module 30 a compares a first hashvalue generated by using the apparatus-side verification hash function34 with a first hash value received from the management server 7 inorder to determine whether or not the former and the latter are equal toeach other and outputs a result of the comparison to the authenticationinformation write verification module 36.

Then, at the next step 502, the authentication information writeverification module 36 receives the result of the comparison fromthe-write module 30 a and also acquires an apparatus ID 41 through theauthentication module 20. Then, the authentication information writeverification module 36 outputs the result of the comparison and theapparatus ID 41 to the factory system by way of the connection means 10.

At a step 504, the factory system adds a product serial number to theresult of the comparison and the apparatus ID 41, which have beenreceived from the authentication information write verification module36, transmitting the product serial number, the result of the comparisonand the apparatus ID 41 to the management server 7.

At a step 506, the management server 7 receives the product serialnumber, the result of the comparison and the apparatus ID 41 from thefactory system. Then, on the basis of the result of the comparison, themanagement server 7 verifies that the first hash value generated byusing the apparatus-side verification hash function 34 and the firsthash value received from the management server 7 are equal to eachother, confirming that the apparatus authentication information has beenincluded in the CE apparatus 9.

The remaining steps are the same as their respective counterparts in thefirst embodiment. That is to say, at a step 134, the management server 7stores the apparatus ID 41 and the product serial number in a memory byassociating the apparatus ID 41 and the product serial number with eachother. Then, at the next step 136, the management server 7 adds a dateon the received data, puts a signature serving as secret information onthe dated data and transmits the dated data to the factory system.

At the factory system, the signature is verified in order to confirmthat the apparatus authentication information has been included properlyin the CE apparatus 9.

As described above, in the case of the embodiment, the management server7 is capable of confirming that apparatus authentication information hasbeen included in the CE apparatus 9 on the basis a result ofverification.

In addition, since the management server 7 does not need to generate asecond hash value, the magnitude of the load borne by the managementserver 7 can be reduced.

In the case of this embodiment, the write module 30 a generates a firsthash value. However, it is to be noted that another configuration canalso be provided as a configuration in which the authentication moduleis provided with the apparatus-side verification hash function 34 so asto allow the authentication module to generate a first hash value. Inthis configuration, the authentication information write verificationmodule 36 receives the first hash value and an apparatus ID from theauthentication module and verifies that the received hash value is equalto the other one.

In addition, it is also possible to provide a configuration in which thefunction of the authentication information write verification module 36is included in the write module 30 a. In this case, the write module 30a transmits a result of verification to the management server 7.

1. An apparatus authentication information inclusion system, whichcomprises a providing server and a terminal and is used for includingapparatus authentication information in said terminal as informationused by an apparatus authentication server to authenticate said terminalwherein: said providing server provides source information used as asource for generating apparatus authentication information to saidterminal and provides said apparatus authentication information or saidsource information to said apparatus authentication server forauthenticating said terminal; and said terminal stores information asinformation necessary for transmitting said apparatus authenticationinformation by using said received source information and, at a terminalauthentication time, transmits said apparatus authentication informationgenerated from said source information by using said stored informationto said apparatus authentication server.
 2. The apparatus authenticationinformation inclusion system according to claim 1 wherein: saidproviding server provides said terminal with a conversion value obtainedas a result of a conversion process carried out by using a predetermineddirectional-function on apparatus authentication information generatedfrom said source information; said terminal generates a conversion valueby execution of a conversion process using said predetermineddirectional-function on apparatus authentication information generatedfrom said received source information; and said terminal compares saidgenerated conversion value with said conversion value received from saidproviding server to produce a result of determination as to whether saidgenerated conversion value is equal to said received conversion value.3. The apparatus authentication information inclusion system accordingto claim 1 wherein: said terminal provides said providing server with aconversion value obtained as a result of a conversion process carriedout by using a predetermined directional-function on apparatusauthentication information generated from said source information; saidproviding server generates a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using said predetermined directional-function onapparatus authentication information generated from said received sourceinformation; and said providing server compares said generatedconversion value with said conversion value received from said terminalto produce a result of determination as to whether or not said generatedconversion value is equal to said received conversion value.
 4. Aterminal comprising: source-information acquisition means for acquiringsource information provided by a providing server as a source used forgenerating apparatus authentication information; generation means forgenerating apparatus authentication information from said acquiredsource information; and apparatus authentication informationtransmission means for transmitting said generated apparatusauthentication information to an apparatus authentication server at anapparatus authentication time.
 5. The terminal according to claim 4wherein: said source information is encrypted apparatus authenticationinformation obtained as a result of a process to encrypt said apparatusauthentication information; and said generation-means generates saidapparatus authentication information by decrypting said encryptedapparatus authentication information.
 6. The terminal according to claim4, further comprising storage means for encrypting apparatusauthentication information generated by said generation means andstoring a result of encrypting said apparatus authenticationinformation, wherein said apparatus authentication informationtransmission means decrypts apparatus authentication information storedin said storage means and transmits a result of decrypting saidapparatus authentication information.
 7. The terminal according to claim6, further comprising key generation means which is used for generatingan encryption key for processes to encrypt apparatus authenticationinformation to be stored into said storage means and decrypt apparatusauthentication information stored in said storage means by usinginformation peculiar to said terminal when it is desired to utilize saidencryption key.
 8. The terminal according to claim 7, further comprisingkey deletion means for deleting said generated encryption key within apredetermined period right after use of said encryption key.
 9. Theterminal according to claim 4, further comprising: conversion-valueacquisition means for acquiring a conversion value obtained as a resultof a conversion process carried out by using a predetermined onedirectional function on said apparatus authentication information fromsaid providing server; conversion-value computation means for computinga conversion value by execution of a conversion process using saidpredetermined one-directional function on said generated apparatusauthentication information; and determination means for producing aresult of determination as to whether or not said acquired conversionvalue is equal to said computed conversion value.
 10. The terminalaccording to claim 9, further comprising: conversion-value computationmeans for computing a conversion value by execution of a conversionprocess using another one-directional function on said generatedapparatus authentication information; and conversion-value-providingmeans for providing said computed conversion value to said providingserver.
 11. The terminal according to claim 4, further comprising:conversion-value computation means for computing a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using a predetermined one-directionalfunction on said generated apparatus authentication information; andconversion-value-providing means for providing said computed conversionvalue to said providing server.
 12. The terminal according to claim 4,further comprising storage means for storing said acquired sourceinformation, wherein said apparatus authentication informationtransmission means generates apparatus authentication information fromsaid stored source information and transmits said apparatusauthentication information to said apparatus authentication server. 13.An apparatus authentication information processing method adopted in aterminal implemented as a computer comprising source-informationacquisition means, generation means and apparatus authenticationinformation transmission means, said apparatus authenticationinformation processing method including: a source-informationacquisition step of driving said source-information acquisition means toacquire source information provided by a providing server as a sourceused for generating apparatus authentication information; an generationstep of driving said generation means to generate apparatusauthentication information from said acquired source information; and anapparatus authentication information transmission step of driving saidapparatus authentication information transmission means to transmit saidgenerated apparatus authentication information to an apparatusauthentication server at an apparatus authentication time.
 14. Theapparatus authentication information processing method according toclaim 13 whereby: said source information is encrypted apparatusauthentication information obtained as a result of a process to encryptsaid apparatus authentication information; and at said generation step,said apparatus authentication information is generated by decryptingsaid encrypted apparatus authentication information.
 15. The apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 13,further including a storage step of encrypting apparatus authenticationinformation generated by said generation means and storing a result ofencrypting said apparatus authentication information into storage meansalso employed in said computer whereby, at said apparatus authenticationinformation transmission step, apparatus authentication informationstored in said storage means is decrypted and transmitted.
 16. Theapparatus authentication information processing method according toclaim 15 wherein said computer further comprises key generation means,said apparatus authentication information processing method furtherincluding a key generation step of driving said key generation means togenerate an encryption key prior to use of said encryption key inprocesses to encrypt apparatus authentication information to be storedinto said storage means and decrypt apparatus authentication informationstored in said storage means by using information peculiar to saidterminal.
 17. The apparatus authentication information processing methodaccording to claim 16 wherein said computer further has key deletionmeans, said apparatus authentication information processing methodfurther including a key deletion step of driving said key deletion meansto delete said generated encryption key within a predetermined periodright after use of said encryption key.
 18. The apparatus authenticationinformation processing method according to claim 13 wherein saidcomputer further comprises conversion-value acquisition means,conversion-value computation means and determination means, saidapparatus authentication information processing method furtherincluding: a conversion-value acquisition step of driving saidconversion-value acquisition means to acquire a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on said apparatus authenticationinformation from said providing server; a conversion-value computationstep of driving said conversion-value computation means to compute aconversion value by execution of a conversion process using saidpredetermined one-directional function on said generated apparatusauthentication information; and a determination step of driving saiddetermination means to produce a result of determination as to whetheror not said acquired conversion value is equal to said computedconversion value.
 19. The apparatus authentication informationprocessing method according to claim 18 wherein said computer furthercomprises conversion-value computation means andconversion-value-providing means, said apparatus authenticationinformation processing method further including: a conversion-valuecomputation step of driving said conversion-value computation means tocompute a conversion value by execution of a conversion process usinganother one-directional function on said generated apparatusauthentication information; and a conversion-value-providing step ofdriving said conversion-value-providing means to provide said computedconversion value to said providing server.
 20. The apparatusauthentication information processing method according to claim 13wherein said computer further comprises conversion-value computationmeans and conversion-value-providing means, said apparatusauthentication information processing method further including: aconversion-value computation step of driving said conversion-valuecomputation means to compute a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using a predetermined one-directional function onsaid generated apparatus authentication information; and aconversion-value-providing step of driving saidconversion-value-providing means to provide said computed conversionvalue to said providing server.
 21. The apparatus authenticationinformation processing method according to claim 13 wherein saidcomputer further comprises storage means for storing said acquiredsource information and, at said apparatus authentication informationtransmission step, apparatus authentication information is generatedfrom said stored source information and transmitted to said apparatusauthentication server.
 22. An apparatus authentication informationprocessing program to be executed by a computer to implement: asource-information acquisition function of acquiring source informationprovided by a providing server as a source used for generating apparatusauthentication information; a generation function of generatingapparatus authentication information from said acquired sourceinformation; and an apparatus authentication information transmissionfunction of transmitting said generated apparatus authenticationinformation to an apparatus authentication server at an apparatusauthentication time.
 23. The apparatus authentication informationprocessing program according to claim 22 wherein: said sourceinformation is encrypted apparatus authentication information obtainedas a result of a process to encrypt said apparatus authenticationinformation; and said generation function generates said apparatusauthentication information by decrypting said encrypted apparatusauthentication information.
 24. The apparatus authentication informationprocessing program according to claim 22, said apparatus authenticationinformation processing program further comprising a storage function ofencrypting apparatus authentication information generated by saidgeneration function and storing-a result of encrypting said apparatusauthentication information, wherein said apparatus authenticationinformation transmission function decrypts apparatus authenticationinformation stored by said storage function and transmits a result ofdecrypting said apparatus authentication information.
 25. The apparatusauthentication information processing program according to claim 24,further comprising a key generation function, which is to be executed bya computer to generate an encryption key for processes to encryptapparatus authentication information to be stored by said storagefunction and decrypt apparatus authentication information stored by saidstorage function by using information peculiar to said terminal when itis desired to utilize said encryption key.
 26. The apparatusauthentication information processing program according to claim 25,further comprising a key deletion function to be executed by a computerto delete said generated encryption key within a predetermined periodright after use of said encryption key.
 27. The apparatus authenticationinformation processing program according to claim 22, furthercomprising: a conversion-value acquisition function to be executed bysaid computer to acquire a conversion value obtained as a result of aconversion process carried out by using a predetermined one-directionalfunction on said apparatus authentication information from saidproviding server; a conversion-value computation function to be executedby said computer to compute a conversion-value by execution of aconversion process using said predetermined one-directional function onsaid generated apparatus authentication information; and a determinationfunction to be executed by said computer to produce a result ofdetermination as to whether or not said acquired conversion value isequal to said computed conversion value.
 28. The apparatusauthentication information processing program according to claim 27,further comprising: a conversion-value computation function to beexecuted by said computer to compute a conversion value by execution ofa conversion process using another one-directional function on saidgenerated apparatus authentication information; and aconversion-value-providing function to be executed by said computer toprovide said computed conversion value to said providing server.
 29. Theapparatus authentication information processing program according toclaim 22, further comprising: a conversion-value computation function tobe executed by said computer to compute a conversion value by executionof a conversion process using a predetermined one-directional functionon said generated apparatus authentication information; and aconversion-value-providing function to be executed by said computer toprovide said computed conversion value to said providing server.
 30. Theapparatus authentication information processing program according toclaim 22, further comprising a storage function to be executed by saidcomputer to store said acquired source information, wherein saidapparatus authentication information transmission function generatesapparatus authentication information from said stored source informationand transmits an apparatus authentication information to said apparatusauthentication server.
 31. A storage medium, which can be read by acomputer and is used for storing an apparatus authentication informationprocessing program to be executed by said computer to implement: asource-information acquisition function of acquiring source informationprovided by a providing server as a source used for generating apparatusauthentication information; a generation function of generatingapparatus authentication information from said acquired sourceinformation; and an apparatus authentication information transmissionfunction of transmitting said generated apparatus authenticationinformation to an apparatus authentication server at an apparatusauthentication time.
 32. A providing server comprising:source-information-providing means for providing a terminal with sourceinformation used as a source for generating apparatus authenticationinformation; apparatus authentication information providing means forproviding said apparatus authentication information or said sourceinformation to an apparatus authentication server for authenticatingsaid terminal; conversion-value acquisition means for acquiring aconversion value obtained as a result of a conversion process carriedout by using a predetermined one-directional function on apparatusauthentication information generated on the basis of said sourceinformation from said terminal; conversion-value computation means forcomputing a conversion value by execution of a conversion process usingsaid one-directional function on said apparatus authenticationinformation; and determination means for producing a result ofdetermination as to whether or not said acquired conversion value isequal to said computed conversion value.
 33. The providing serveraccording to claim 32, further comprising determination-resulttransmission means for transmitting a determination result produced bysaid determination means to a main organization for including saidsource information.
 34. An apparatus authentication informationproviding method to be adopted in a computer, which comprisessource-information-providing means, apparatus authentication informationproviding means, conversion-value acquisition means, conversion-valuecomputation means, and determination means, to execute: asource-information-providing step of driving saidsource-information-providing means to provide a terminal with sourceinformation used as a source for generating apparatus authenticationinformation; an apparatus authentication information providing step ofdriving said apparatus authentication information providing means toprovide said apparatus authentication information or said sourceinformation to an apparatus authentication server for authenticatingsaid terminal; a conversion-value acquisition step of driving saidconversion-value acquisition means to acquire a conversion valueobtained as a result of a conversion process carried out by using apredetermined one-directional function on apparatus authenticationinformation generated on the basis of said source information from saidterminal; a conversion-value computation step of driving saidconversion-value computation means to compute a conversion value byexecution of a conversion process using said one-directional function onsaid apparatus authentication information; and a determination step ofdriving said determination means to produce a result of determination asto whether or not said acquired conversion value is equal to saidcomputed conversion value.
 35. The apparatus authentication informationproviding method according to claim 34, comprising adetermination-result transmission step of driving determination-resulttransmission means additionally employed in said computer as furthermeans for transmitting a determination result produced by saiddetermination means to a main organization for including said sourceinformation.
 36. An apparatus authentication information providingprogram to be executed by a computer to carry out: asource-information-providing function of providing a terminal withsource information used as a source for generating apparatusauthentication information; an apparatus authentication informationproviding function of providing said apparatus authenticationinformation or said source information to an apparatus authenticationserver for authenticating said terminal; a conversion-value acquisitionfunction of acquiring a conversion value obtained as a result of aconversion process carried out by using a predetermined one-directionalfunction on apparatus authentication information generated on the basisof said source information from said terminal; a conversion-valuecomputation function of computing a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using said one-directional function on said apparatusauthentication information; and a determination function of producing aresult of determination as to whether or not said acquired conversionvalue is equal to said computed conversion value.
 37. The apparatusauthentication information providing program according to claim 36,further comprising a determination-result transmission function to beexecuted by said computer to transmit a determination result produced bysaid determination function to a main organization for including saidsource information.
 38. A storage medium, which can be read by acomputer and is used for storing an apparatus authentication informationprocessing program to be executed by said computer to implement: asource-information-providing function of providing a terminal withsource information used as a source for generating apparatusauthentication information; an apparatus authentication informationproviding function of providing said apparatus authenticationinformation or said source information to an apparatus authenticationserver for authenticating said terminal; a conversion-value acquisitionfunction of acquiring a conversion value obtained as a result of aconversion process carried out by using a predetermined one-directionalfunction on apparatus authentication information generated on the basisof said source information from said terminal; a conversion-valuecomputation function of computing a conversion value by execution of aconversion process using said one-directional function on said apparatusauthentication information; and a determination function of producing aresult of determination as to whether or not said acquired conversionvalue is equal to said computed conversion value.